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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the interaction between relative factor abundance and income-induced 
policy differences  in determining the  pattern of trade and the effect of trade  liberalization on 
pollution.  If  a rich and capital abundant North trades with a poor and labor abundant South, then 
free trade lowers world pollution.  Trade shifts the production of  pollution intensive industries to the 
capital abundant North despite its stricter pollution regulations.  Pollution levels rise in the North 
while those in the South fall.  These results can be reversed however if  the North-South income gap 
is "too large" for, in this case, the pattern of trade is driven by income-induced pollution policy 
differences across countries.  Capital mobility may raise or lower world pollution depending on the 
pattern of  trade. 
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There is still much that we do not know about the effects of trade liberalization on 
environmental quality.  Grossman and  Krueger (1993)  have  argued  that NAFTA may 
reduce  pollution in  part  because  it  will  raise  incomes  in  Mexico  and  thereby  create  a 
demand for better enforcement of pollution regulations.  On the other hand, there is some 
evidence  that  low-income  countries  with  relatively  weak  pollution  regulations  are 
developing  a  comparative  advantage  in  pollution-intensive industries  (Low and  Yeats, 
1992).  In general, we would expect that trade liberalization may sometimes benefit the 
environment and sometimes harm it.  It is  therefore important that we develop a set of 
analytical techniques that can help us to indentify cases in which the environment may be 
jeopardized by trade. 
In our earlier work (Copeland and Taylor,  1994,  1995), we  developed a simple 
model  to  isolate the  role  of income  differences  between countries  in  determining  the 
pattern of trade  and the  international incidence of pollution.  Because the demand for 
environmental  quality  is  a  normal  good,  that  model  predicted  that  higher  income 
countries would choose stricter pollution regulations.  If there were no other differences 
between  countries,  then  higher  income  countries  would  endogenously  develop  a 
comparative  advantage  in  relative  clean  goods,  while  lower  income  countries  would 
develop a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods.  Because trade shifted the 
location of the most pollution intensive industries to countries with the weakest pollution 
regulations, the model predicts that trade liberalization could increase world pollution. 
Income  differences  are  only  one  of many  differences  between  countries  that 
contribute to the pattern of  trade.  Richer countries tend to be more capital abundant than 
poorer countries and this capital abundance in itself is an important determinant of trade 
patterns.  Differences  in factor  abundance  interact with income-induced differences  in 
pollution  policy  to  determine  the  pattern  of  trade  and  the  effects  of  trade  on 
2 environmental quality.  The purpose of this paper is to  develop a very simple model to 
examine this interaction. 1 
We  consider a two good model in which each industry pollutes.  There are two 
primary factors: capital and labour.  Labour is the only primary input in industry X, while 
capital is the only primary input in industry Y.  We assume that the capital-using industry 
is pollution-intensive, and we assume that the North is richer than the South. 
Using this framework, we obtain several interesting results.  First, we find that for 
small differences in income levels, the pattern of  trade is determined by differences in the 
abundance of primary factors.  Despite being richer, the capital abundant country exports 
the pollution-intensive good.  Although each country chooses different pollution policy to 
reflect differences in income, the differences in pollution policy are not strong enough to 
offset the effects of  differences in relative factor abundance. 
Next,  for  differences  in  income  that  are  large  relative  to  differences  in  factor 
abundance,  we  find  that  income  differences  determine  the  pattern  of trade.  Higher 
income countries choose stricter pollution policy and if the income differences are large 
enough, then the higher income country will import the capital-using good, despite being 
a capital abundant country. 
Third, the effects of  trade on the incidence and level of world pollution depend on 
differences  in  factor  abundance  relative  to  differences  in  income  levels.  If factor 
abundance differences are large, then pollution rises in the North and falls  in the South 
with trade.  Moreover,  because  trade  tends  to  shift production of pollution intensive 
industries to  the region with stricter pollution regulations, then trade causes a decline in 
world  pollution.  This  contrasts  with  our  previous  results,  but  is  consistent  with  the 
evidence that rich countries tend to be large polluters. 
On the other hand, if income differences are large, then the pattern of trade and 
effects of trade on pollution are consistent with our earlier results:  pollution rises in the 
1  Rauscher (1991) has examined the effects of  capital mobility on the environment, but he has a one-good 
model with no goods trade.  He also does not highlight the role of income in determining pollution policy. 
A recent working paper by Richelle (1996) also adopts a specific factors model, although different from 
ours, to examine the interaction between trade and capital mobility when pollution is transboundary. 
3 South,  and  falls  in  the  North;  and  world  pollution  rises  with  the  shift  in  pollution-
intensive industry to the relatively low income region. 
Finally, we consider the effects of capital mobility on pollution.  We find  that 
when  factor abundance determines trade patterns, then allowing free capital mobility will 
cause world pollution to  rise (from free  trade  levels) as  pollution intensive production 
shifts to the South.  If instead income differences determine trade patterns, then allowing 
free capital mobility leads to a fall in world pollution. 
The  next  section sets  up  the  model.  Autarky  is  examined in section 3.  The 
pattern of trade and the effects of trade on the environment are  analyzed in section 4. 
Section 5 considers capital mobility and the final section sums up. 
2.  The Model 
There are two industries, X and Y.  Each uses a specific factor:  labour for X, and 
capital for Y; and each generates pollution.  As shown in Copeland and Taylor (1994) we 
can equivalently treat pollution as if it were an input into production that can be varied to 
minimize costs.  To keep the model simple, we adopt the following functional form: 
X =  F(L,Z  )  =  x  { 
LI-uZ u 
x  0  if 
if Zx/L~  'A, 
ZxlL> 'A, 
(I) 
where Z denotes pollution and 0 < u < I.  The extra constraint arises because pollution is 
in fact  a  by-product of production, and hence output must be  bounded above for  any 
given labour input.  This constraint is reflected in the requirement Zx ::;  'AL  since this 
ensures that X::; 'AuL.  Similarly, the production function for Y is 
{ 
KI-PZ  P 
Y= G(K,Z  )  =  y 
y  0  if 
(2) 
We assume that the capital intensive industry is pollution-intensive; hence P > u.  We 
also  assume  that  pollution  is  generated  only  by  production,  and  that  its  effects  are 
confined to the country of  origin.  Thus total pollution is 
4 z=zx + Zy. 
Note that if  the government chooses an aggregate target for pollution (so that Z ~ Z  ) and 
if  the right to pollute is distributed efficiently across firms, then we have a simple specific 
factors  model with environmental services (pollution) as the mobile factor,  and capital 
and labour as the specific factors. 
Preferences are given by 
U(x,y,z)  =  In[xbyl-b] - yZ  (3) 
where b is the share of  spending on good X.  The indirect utility function has the form: 
V= In(I) - In[h(p)]  - yZ,  (4) 
where h(P) is a price index, I is income and p is the relative price ofX. 
As  in  Copeland  and  Taylor  (1994),  governments  choose  pollution  levels  to 
maximize the utility of the representative agent, but they do  not attempt to use pollution 
policy to  manipulate the terms of trade.  Choosing Z to  maximize (4) (treating goods 
prices as given) yields 
't=-VZNI =yl.  (5) 
where 't  is  the  shadow price of the right to  pollute.  We  assume that the  government 
implements its policy efficiently; this is equivalent to assuming that it issues Z pollution 
permits, with 't  being the equilibrium price of a permit.  Equation (5) requires that the 
government  choose  the  pollution  level  so  that  the  price  of a  permit  is  equal  to  the 
marginal  damage (- V ZN  I)  caused by pollution.  Since environmental  quality  is  a 
normal good, the marginal damage from  pollution is  increasing in income, and in our 
simple specification, marginal damage increases in direct proportion to income. 
3.  Autarky 
Pollution  is  determined  by  demand  and  supply.  The  supply  of pollution  is 
determined by government policy (5).  In autarky, the demand for  pollution is  derived 
from producer and consumer behaviour.  From (1), the share of pollution in production 




Similarly, pollution from the Y industry is 
Zy = p~y 
(6) 
(7) 
We can eliminate outputs from (6) and (7) by noting that in autarky, the supply of X is 
equal to the demand for X, which is just x = bIlpx.  Similarly, y = (l-b)I1py.  Substituting 
into (6) and (7) and summing, we have the total derived demand for pollution: 
Z=(ab+p(l-b))1  =  31 
't  't  '  (8) 
where 3  ==  ab + P( I-b). Note that the demand for  pollution is  increasing in  income (in 
autarky, a higher consumption level requires higher production, which in tum generates 
an increased demand for pollution).  Also, the demand for pollution is decreasing in the 
price of pollution permits: as  't rises, firms switch to  less pollution intensive techniques, 
and consumers substitute towards the cleaner good (since it becomes relatively cheaper). 
The autarky pollution level is obtained by equating the demand for pollution (8) 
equal to the supply (5).  This yields: 
3 
Za=-
y  (9) 
As in Copeland and Taylor (1994), the level of pollution in autarky is independent of the 
country's income.  A higher income country has a larger scale of production, and hence 
higher pollution demand, but it also has a higher demand for environmental quality and 
enforces  cleaner  production  techniques  by  imposing  higher  pollution  taxes.  In  this 
model, the scale and technique effects of an increase in income on pollution just offset 
each other. 
4.  Trade 
Let us  now consider the  effects of international trade.  There are  two  potential 
motives  for  trade:  capital/labour  ratios  may  differ  across  countries,  and  pollution 
regulations may differ.  We begin by  finding the relative demand and supply for X to 
6 illustrate the effects of  differences in endowments and policy on the autarky relative price 
of X.  Once the pattern of trade is determined, we will then consider the effects of trade 
on environmental quality. 
Let good Y be the numeraire Cry = 1) and let p ==  Px.  Since the share of spending 
on X is b, the demand for X relative to Y is given by 
x  b 
y  (1  - b)p .  (10) 
Note that the relative demand is independent of  income and hence each country's relative 
demand and the world relative demand all look the same. 
To determine  the relative supply of  X in autarky we use the production functions 
(1) and (2), noting that each specific factor is fully employed in its respective sector, and 
that pollution in each sector is given by (6) and (7).  Substituting (6) and (7) into (1) and 
(2), solving for outputs and dividing yields 
X  (ap)all-aL 
Y  pPIl-PK 
(p-a)/(I-p)(I-a)  't  ,  (11) 
The relative demand and supply curves for XlY are sketched in Figure 1. 
Although't is an endogenous variable, equation (11) is nevertheless useful to help 
build our intuition about the patterns of  trade.  Let us first suppose that pollution taxes are 
identical across countries, but that one country (North) is more capital abundant.  Since 
capital is  used in the  Y  industry,  this  reduces  the  relative  supply of X  in the North, 
shifting  in the  relative  supply  curve and pushing up  the  autarky  relative  prices of X. 
North has a comparative advantage in Y, and the pattern of trade will be determined by 
factor endowment  ratios: the capital abundant country exports the capital intensive good. 
This is the standard Heckscher-Ohlin story. 
If instead factor abundance ratios are identical across countries, but North has a 
higher pollution tax, then since X is relatively clean, North's relative supply for X  will 
shift out to  the right, generating a comparative advantage in X  based on differences in 
pollution  policy.  For  identical  factor  endowment  ratios,  the  country  with  stricter 
pollution policy exports the clean good.  Since from (5), pollution policy is determined by 
income, then the trade pattern in this case is determined by income levels: North exports 
7 the clean good and South exports the dirty good.  This was the trade pattern in our earlier 
papers (Copeland and Taylor 1994, 1995). 
In  the  present paper,  we  assume  that North is  both  capital  abundant  and  rich. 
Capital abundance shifts the relative supply curve in to the left, while high income shifts 
the curve out and to the right.  North's comparative advantage will be determined by the 
relative  strength of these  two  effects.  To  obtain  a  condition  on  pollution  taxes  that 
determines the pattern of trade,  note that because relative demands are  identical across 
countries, North will export X if its relative supply curve is to the right of South's.  Using 
(11) and its Southern analogue, we find that XlY > X* /y* for given p if  and only if 
(
L *1K*)(1-/3)(1-a)/(/3-a) 
>  LIK  (12) 
Recalling that  /3  > a, then as we discussed above, (12) implies that if factor endowment 
ratios (LIK) are identical across countries, then North will always export X if it is richer 
(since  then  't  >  't*).  On  the  other  hand,  if the  countries  do  not  differ  too  much  in 
aggregate income, but if Home is sufficiently capital abundant, then Home may import X 
and export the pollution intensive good, despite its higher pollution tax.  This is  because 
the price of Y depends on both the pollution tax 't, and on the cost of capital.  A  low 
capital  cost  may  more  than  offset  high  pollution taxes  and  result  in  North  being  an 
exporter of  the pollution intensive good. 
Equation  (12)  tells  only  part  of the  story  about  the  pattern  of trade  because 
pollution taxes are endogenous.  Let us  now determine  the equilibrium conditions for 
free trade.  It is useful to write these in terms of production shares.  Let 8  ==  px/l denote 
the share of  x production in national income.  The for any p, we have from (7): 
Zx  = apx  = apx  a8 
't  yl  y'  (13) 
Similarly, 
.:......: /3(,--1 _-8-"-) 
Zy  =  y  (14) 
8 In autarky, the share of spending on x  is the same as the share of x  output in 
national income, and hence 8a = b.  Once a country is opened up to trade, 8 and b may 
differ.  Because the share of  world spending on X is given by b we must always have 
p(x + x*) 
=b,  p(x + x*) + (y+y*) 
or 
8q> + 8*(1 - q»  = b, 
where q>  ==  11(1+1*) is North's share of world income and 0 < q>  < 1.  Thus in free trade, if 
production patterns differ across countries, b must lie between 8 and 8*.  Consequently, 
trade will typically cause 8 to rise in one country and fall in the other.  Moreover, note 
that  if 8  >  8*,  then  Home  must  export  X,  because  preferences  are  identical  and 
homothetic. 
To  determine  equilibrium  production  shares,  note  that  equilibrium  in  world 
markets requires that world relative demand equal relative supply; that is,  recalling the 
form of  the relative demand (10), we require: 
x + x*  b 
--
y+y*  (l - b)p· 
Using (13) and (14) in (I) and (2), and subsituting into (15) yields: 
(P/y)p  b[(1  - 8)PKI-p +  (I - 8*)K*I-p] 
P = (u/y)u  (I - b)[8ULI-u +  8*L*I-u] 
(15) 
(16) 
As well, relative supply in each country must also be equal to the world relative price.  In 
the North, we have 
(17) 
We can now obtain two  simple  equations that  determine the  two  endogenous 
variables 8  and 8*.  Because each country  faces  the  same goods prices in free  trade, 
equating (17) and  its Southern analogue yields 
KI-P  81- u  K*I-P  8*I-u 
= 
LI-u (I - 8)I-p  L*I-u (1- 8*)I-p· 
(18) 
9 Next  relative  supply  conditions  in each  country  must  reflect  world  relative  demand. 
Equating (16) and (17) yields 
KI-P  81- a 
Ll-a (1  - 8)I-p 
b[(1  - 8)PKl-p + (1  - 8*)K*I-p] 
(1  - b)[8aLl-a + 8*L*I-a] 
(19) 
Figure 2 plots (18) and (19) for the case where Home is  an exporter of the clean 
good.  Equation (18)  yields  an  upward  sloping  relation  between 8  and 8*  because  a 
higher relative price of X must lead to  higher production of X in both countries.  The 
curvature depends on relative factor endowments.  Equation (19) reflects world supply 
and demand, and yields a negative relationship between 8 and 8*.  For a given level of 
world demand for X, if more is produced at Home (8 rises) then less must be  produced 
abroad so that markets clear (8*) falls. 
We  can use  (18) to  determine  the  effects of factor  endowments  on production 
patterns.  Let  the  labour/capital  ratio  in  each  country  be  denoted  by  'A  and  'A *, 




('A*/'A)I-a  . 
(20). 
To  interpret (20), first suppose that the two countries are  identical.  Then with K = K* 
and 'A = 'A *, we must have identical production patterns: 8 = 8*.  Next suppose that factor 
endowment ratios are identical ('A =  'A *), but that North is richer than the South (K > K*). 
Then we have 8 > 8*: North allocates a larger fraction of its economy to  X production 
than the South.  This is because with North's higher wealth, it chooses stricter pollution 
regulations, which favours the relatively clean industry.  In this case, North exports the 
clean good. 
However, suppose that North is  relatively well endowed with capital  ('A  <  'A *). 
Then providing that K is not too large, we have 8 < 8*.  Despite its higher income, North 
may export the dirty good because its abundance of capital more than offsets the costlier 
pollution regulations.  Finally, note from  (20) that for  any  given  'A  and  'A *,  if North is 
sufficiently rich (K is sufficiently large), then we must have 8 > 8*. 
10 Proposition  1.  Suppose  L  */K*  and  LlK  are  given  and  North  is  relatively  capital 
- -
abundant.  Then there exists  K  such that (1)  if  K < K  then North exports the dirty 
good, and if K >  K  then North exports the clean good. 
Next, let us consider the effects of  trade on pollution.  Total pollution is given by 
a8 + P(1  - 8)  P - (P - a)8 
Z = Zx + Zy  =  Y  =  Y  (21) 
From (21), we have dZ/d8 < O.  Thus if  the share of  the clean good (X) in national income 
rises with trade, then pollution falls, and if the share of  the dirty good rises (8 falls), then 
pollution rises. 
Proposition 2.  Consider a movement from autarky to  free  trade. If North exports the 
clean good, then pollution falls in the North and rises in the South.  If  North exports the 
dirty good, then pollution rises in the North and falls in the South. 
Proof:  Use (21) and Prop. 1. 
Propositions 1 and 2 generalize our earlier work by allowing a richer interaction 
between income levels and comparative advantage.  In Copeland and Taylor (1994), trade 
always lowered pollution in the North by  encouraging pollution intensive industries to 
move  to  low  income  countries.  In  the  present  model,  comparative  advantage  is 
determined by  the interaction between capital abundance and income.  A high income 
country which is  also capital abundant may have a comparative advantage in  pollution 
intensive  industries,  and  may  therefore  choose  to  allow  pollution  to  rise  with  trade. 
However,  our  results  also  suggest  that  a  sufficiently  high  income  can  push  up 
environmental regulations by enough to more than offset the cost advantage due to capital 
abundance.  Sufficiently rich capital abundant countries will reduce their pollution and 
export clean goods in the move to free trade. 
Proposition 2 indicates that trade alters the incidence of pollution across countries 
by  stimulating  pollution  intensive  industries  in  some  countries  and  stimulating  clean 
industries in other countries.  It is also of interest to determine whether trade leads to  a 
11 net increase or decrease in global pollution. Using (9), world pollution in autarky is given 
by 
w 
Z  =  23/y.  a 
Using (21), world pollution in free trade is given by 
w 
Z  = Z+Z* 
t 
Subtracting (22) from (23) yields 
2/3 - (/3 - a)(8 + 8*) 
y 
w  w  1 




where it should be recalled that <p  is North's share of  world income.  Now, we have /3  > a 
since Y is pollution intensive, and we have <p  > 112  since North is richer than South by 
assumption.  Thus the sign of (24) depends on the sign of 8  - 8*.  If North exports the 
clean  good  (8 >  8*), then world  pollution rises  with  trade.  This  is  the  same  result 
obtained in Copeland and Taylor (1994).  Because 't > 't*, a shift of pollution intensive 
industries to  the  South raises  the average pollution intensity of global production and 
raises world pollution.  This is the basis of the argument that trade may create pollution 
havens that lower average global environmental qUality. 
Once we allow for  differences  in factor  endowments, however,  a  richer set of 
possibilities emerges.  If the North is capital abundant, then it may export the pollution 
intensive good.  In this case, 8 < 8*, and from (24), world pollution falls with trade.  In 
this case, trade shifts some of  the pollution intensive industry to the North, where stricter 
pollution  regulations  lead  to  cleaner  techniques  of production.  As  a  result,  trade 
liberalization can lower world pollution. 
Proposition 3.  Consider a movement from autarky to free  trade.  If North exports the 
clean good, then world pollution rises with trade.  If North exports the dirty good, then 
world pollution falls with trade. 
5.  Capital mobility 
12 Suppose both countries produce both goods in free  trade.  Then free  entry will 
ensure that profits are zero.  Hence we must have: 
cx(w;t) = p, 
cy(r;t) =  1, 
cx(w* ;t*) = p, 
cy(r*;t*) =  1, 
(25) 
(26) 
where Cx and cy are the unit cost functions, and where p is the same across countries in 
free trade.  Since North is richer, we must have 't  > 't*.  Thus from (26), the return on 
capital is lower in the North than the South because of  the stricter pollution regulations. 
Now suppose we allow capital to move freely.  Then capital will flow from North 
to South.  Depending on parameters, it is possible for all capital to  leave the North and 
move  to  the  South.  However,  suppose that the  return  on capital  is  equalized  across 
countries before this happens.  From (26), note that if r = r*, then we must have 't = 't*, 
and consequently, w = w*.  Thus free trade, combined with mobile capital will equalize 
factor prices, provided both industries remain active in each country. 
Let us now consider the effect of capital mobility on world pollution.  Using (6) 
and (7), world pollution is 
Zw =Z+Z* 
a[p(x+x*)  +  f3(y+y*) 
't  (27) 
From our assumptions on preferences, a fraction b of world income is spent on good X; 
hence we have  p(x+x*) = b(l+I*), where I and 1*  denote national incomes, inclusive of 
payments and receipts for income from foreign-owned capital.  Thus (27) can be written 
as 
Zw  =  ab(l+I*)  +  f3(1-b)(I+I*)  =  2[ab + f3(1  - b)]  28 
't  Y  Y 
(28) 
where the middle step follows since 't = 't* = yl = yl*.  As in Copeland and Taylor (1994), 
factor  price  equalization  also  equalizes  incomes  across  countries:  the  richer  country 
chooses to reduce its income in return for a cleaner environment, while the poorer country 
prefers to  allow its  environment to  deteriorate  in return  for  a  higher  income.  If the 
countries are not too different at the outset, then this process will fully equalize incomes 
and factor prices. 
13 Comparing (26) with (22), we  see that world pollution with both free  trade  and 
mobile capital is the same as autarky world pollution.  Since we have already compared 
free  trade  pollution  levels  with  autarky  pollution  levels  in  Proposition  3,  it  is 
straightforward to determine the effects of  capital mobility on world pollution. 
Proposition 4.  Consider a world that initially has free  trade in goods, but not factors. 
Now suppose that capital is allowed to flow freely  between countries, and suppose that 
both industries remain active in each country.  Then (a)  if North initially exports the 
clean good, world pollution will fall  when capital is  allowed to  move; and (b) if North 
initially exports the dirty good, then world pollution will rise when capital is allowed to 
move. 
6.  Conclusion 
In our earlier work, we  developed a model in which countries differed only  in 
income levels.  The purpose of that work was to  isolate the role of income effects and 
identify the influences that differences in income might have on the polluting effects of 
trade.  In reality, trade is determined by the complex interaction of many different forces. 
In  this  paper,  we  illustrate  the  interaction  between  the  effects  of factor  endowment 
differences with income effects. 
Our results depend on the relative strength of the two  forces.  If income effects 
dominate, then the results are much the same as before: trade can lead to the creation of 
pollution havens in poor countries and trade can increase world pollution.  However, if 
differences  in  factor  endowment  ratios  dominate,  then  richer  countries  may  be  net 
exporters of  pollution intensive goods and trade may reduce world pollution. 
Capital mobility may raise or lower world pollution.  However, in the case where 
North initially exports the pollution intensive good, increased capital mobility may raise 
world pollution from its free trade level.  Since this case seems to be empirically relevant 
during the development process, the concerns about the environmental effects of capital 
14 mobility  expressed  by  Daly  and  Goodland  (1994)  and  others  should  be  given  close 
scutiny.  It should be  noted however that free  trade plus  capital  mobility  leave  world 












































































































XIY Figure 2.  Free Trade 
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